Often seen as an interest of environmental lobbyists and advocates, the development and implementation of new forms of energy capture has real security implications as well. This policy brief explores those implications. Focusing primarily on the military's contribution to security and how energy capture affects the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of planning and execution, it argues that more needs to be done, and that future policies must be better designed, diversified, and focused on de-coupling.
doing work. When fire burns wood, it produces radiant heat that can raise the temperature of water to a point that it can be used to cook food or to create steam (and then be harnessed to do other work, such as turning a wheel or driving a turbine). Such activity does not, however, indicate that the energy has been destroyed; rather, it has simply changed its form. This result is the first law of thermodynamics: energy is ubiquitous; it can be neither created nor destroyed. The concept of renewable energy, therefore, refers to the feedstock or raw material that enables energy capture. In addition, some sources, such as fossil fuels, require so much time to ''renew'' that their supplies are effectively finite. Burning oil depletes oil stocks at a rate higher than it can be naturally replaced, whereas solar power captures energy from the sun's rays-which cannot be depleted and are effectively renewed instantly.
The security implications, particularly for the military, of these different forms of capture are real, worthy of further exploration, and require informed policy. Alternative forms of energy capture (energy captured from non-fossil fuels) can be expensive and time consuming. However, the failure to secure new forms of energy capture can result in other equally problematic security challenges. These challenges-particularly those resulting from climate change-have been identified by the international community, scholars, and even the United States military. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has released a fifth report, which now links national security directly to the changing climate, 2 while scholars such as Sarah Light and Siddhartha Velandy have also urged further action on this front. Specifically, they have observed that the United States military is poised to retake the lead in the research and development of alternative forms of energy capture, which would not only address near-term security implications but also go some way to respond to longer-term sustainability issues. Indeed, Velandy argues that this ''green arms race'' could spur industry innovation that has so far eluded large-scale attempts to address climate change. 3 More recently, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has drawn direct links between climate change and its ability to do its job. Its report articulates three broad goals of identifying the impact of climate change on military operations, integrating climate change as a factor in planning, and collaborating with all stakeholders on potential solutions. These goals are enabled by four ''lines of effort'': planning and operations; infrastructure; the supply chain; and training. The DoD report is comprehensive and takes the impact of climate change seriously and holistically. leave the military vulnerable 5 and what can be done to address that vulnerability? This policy brief suggests that even though distinct vulnerabilities exist at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, dealing with them requires a holistic appreciation of the problem. Militaries must therefore continue to seek out new sources of energy for short-term tactical and operational advantages that, coincidentally, should also result in longer-term strategic benefits. This article will conclude with a series of policy proposals for energy capture security.
Security and new forms of energy capture
Militaries differentiate between and among three levels of operation. Weapons and equipment are brought to bear against a specific objective at the tactical level. It is, therefore, the level of battle at which two sides fight in a common space at a common time. Threats at the tactical level affect the effective employment of equipment and people on the field of battle. The tactics of battle are connected to the strategy of the broader conflict at the operational level. Security threats at the operational level are threats to resources that maximize the possibility for tactical success. Tactical battles are coordinated to meet a common goal at the strategic level. 6 A strategic approach implies the preparation of a plan in the face of uncertainty. Strategic plans are therefore concerned with both efficiency, as resources are always scarce, and resiliency, as a hedge against that uncertainty. Energy capture threats at the strategic level exploit the tension between resilience and efficiency.
Tactical energy capture vulnerabilities
Thanks to a revolution in military technology, the modern soldier has new energy capture requirements that extend far beyond the food energy requirements of the past. Those requirements are normally met through batteries-lots of batteries. Batteries increase the soldier's physical load. Modern Canadian soldiers deployed in Afghanistan-arguably some of the best equipped soldiers in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalition-carried night vision goggles, weapon sights, lights, laser aiming devices, and personal communications gear which, taken together, required as many as 13 AAA and AA batteries to power. That power would last, depending on the intensity of use, anywhere from a few hours to a few days. Needless to say, replacement batteries were part of the soldier's daily combat load. Without them, soldiers could not see, talk, or employ their weapons effectively. Batteries, and the energy capture role they represent, have become a tactical-level security vulnerability. The need to carry extra batteries compounds a challenge that began to grow during the Vietnam era. As Rob Orr has shown, from antiquity until the midtwentieth century, soldiers carried an average of 30 kilograms with them into battle (largely food, water, and ammunition). 7 During the Vietnam War, however, soldiers took advantage of a digital revolution and added a variety of communications technologies to their kit, with the result that their weight burden increased from 30 kilograms to 45. This relatively recent increase of 50 percent in the combat load of soldiers not only results in more overall energy expenditure but also increases the physical strain on the musculoskeletal systems of the soldiers. As soldiers become increasingly encumbered, they are slower and more prone to injuries. In short, their combat effectiveness decreases.
Operational energy capture vulnerabilities
Militaries cannot just conduct combat; they must also dedicate a certain proportion of their resources to supporting roles. 8 Over time, the combat function of militaries (the ''teeth'') has shrunk in relation to the support function (the ''tail''). In practical terms, for every soldier deployed into combat, several additional soldiers, serving in support functions, are also required. Canada's recent experience in Afghanistan, particularly in Kandahar Province, is an instructive case in point. At its peak, approximately 3,000 soldiers were deployed. Less than onethird, however, actually conducted combat operations. The rest supported them. That supply function involves ensuring that fuel-gas and diesel-keeps flowing. Without fuel, generators, tanks, trucks, ships, and planes cease to function.
The US military is one of the largest single users of oil in the world, consuming almost 350,000 barrels of oil each day. 9 And the fuel used by US military vehicles in Afghanistan cost more than USD$100 per gallon. 10 (In February 2015, US citizens were paying less than USD$3 per gallon to fill up their personal vehicles.
11 ) The Canadian case is similar. Fuel used in Kandahar Province cost anywhere from 120 percent to 360 percent of the market value. 12 That fuel, moreover, had to come overland, through Pakistan in trucks, and images of the backlog at border crossings between Afghanistan and Pakistan are symbolic of the vulnerability that such energy capture requirements pose. 13 
Strategic energy capture vulnerabilities
The concept of efficiency is fundamentally at odds with the idea of resiliency. Efficiency is about using the least amount of energy possible. Such an approach, however, comes at a cost: in simplest terms, efficient systems are vulnerable to even the smallest failure. Resiliency is particularly important when a favourable outcome is so critical that one is willing to tolerate some measure of redundancy even in the absence of a threat; the resilient system is, almost by definition, inefficient. Efficiency, then, entails sacrifices in resiliency. An efficient strategy has few, or even no, options.
The Canadian scholar and public intellectual Thomas Homer-Dixon describes this relationship in terms of coupling. The more tightly coupled a system, the more vulnerable it is to a catastrophic failure. Homer-Dixon uses the analogy of the modern freeway, where cars follow each other closely at high speeds.
14 The freeway design is an efficient means of enabling a large number of vehicles to travel long distances; however, should one car stop suddenly, the resulting cascade of collisions can lead to lengthy pile-ups and back-ups. The solution is clear, yet extraordinarily difficult to implement: drivers must de-couple, or slow down and increase the space between them.
The concept of just-in-time delivery offers another example of the vulnerability of highly efficient systems. Stock, for a retailer or wholesaler, is a fickle thing. Without it, consumers look elsewhere, but in excess, it becomes a drag on the firm's bottom line. Just-in-time delivery means that the manufacturer supplies the retailer or wholesaler with just enough product to allow consumers to purchase exactly what they need. When it works, consumers get the goods they want when they want them, and the retailer or wholesaler avoids the sunk cost of excess supply in the form of merchandise sitting on shelves. The concept breaks down, however, when a truck fails to deliver on time. Without stock, retailers suddenly have nothing to sell, and consumers nothing to buy. Some excess stock is therefore desirable-redundancy provides retailers with a degree of resilience in the face of unanticipated delays.
In terms of energy capture, although increased efficiency in existing techniques is a positive development, new forms of energy capture will inevitably build resiliency into the system: the combination of the old and new forms will create redundancies. Nonetheless, the new forms must also allow for additional redundancies to account for emergency spikes in consumption, as well as to guarantee resilience to shocks, such as mechanical breakdown, cloud cover, dust, or simply a lack of wind. When the ability to capture energy is understood through the lens of security, resiliency must trump efficiency (in terms of both storage and capture).
Energy capture, security, and Canada's perspective Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) is ''the primary delivery agent'' for the Department of National Defence's investment in science and technology. It operates ''at the centre of an innovation community'' that seeks to address Canada's contemporary and future defence and security needs. 15 It would therefore stand to reason that DRDC would be generating research into the security implications of energy capture. Surprisingly, little work has been done. What limited research has been carried out is revealing. A 2012 report does an excellent job of framing the problem of energy capture as it relates to fossil fuels, but stops short of proposing alternatives. A more comprehensive six-year-old report that examines alternative fuels has suggested that what alternatives exist are too inefficient to serve as genuine replacements for traditional energy sources. 16 The most promising DRDC study is a 2001 report that advocates a comprehensive range of alternative power sources for Canadian Armed Forces operations. 17 In spite of these costs, there is little evidence of national efforts to innovate. Thus far, the federal response has focused on the fuels themselves. Fuel, however, whether alterative or not, will need to be shipped to where it is needed. More helpful would be designs that use less fuel in the first place, thereby reducing the amount of fuel shipped and ultimately consumed.
Three ''D''s for energy capture security Three guidelines for policy are recommended. For parsimony's sake, this note will refer to them as the three ''D''s: design, diversify, and de-couple. Design suggests the need to be innovative in the creation of systems that consume less energy and in the development of new techniques of energy capture. Diversification, which addresses the down-side of efficiency, suggests a move away from single sources of energy capture in favour of multiple sources. De-couple refers to the other side of the efficiency-resiliency balance, suggesting that some inefficiency is needed in order to maintain resiliency.
Design efforts that address the tactical-level energy capture challenge are underway outside of Canada. Australia, for example, has been experimenting with solar panel technology that soldiers wear on their load-bearing equipment. The solar panels provide the power requirements for radios and re-charge night vision goggles. 21 Although still in development, several successful trials have been conducted and advances in photovoltaic cell technology are allowing these panels to serve as viable, significantly lighter alternatives to conventional alkaline or nickel-metal hydride batteries. nPOWER, a private company, has also produced a Personal Energy Generator (nPEG). 22 This device, slightly larger than a permanent marker, captures the kinetic energy produced by walking or running and either stores it or automatically recharges a user's cellular phone. In general terms, systems that can capture new forms of energy, be it solar or kinetic, can help meet the tactical security challenge created by conventional batteries.
Diversification operates at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The more diverse the forms of energy capture, the more secure that capture will be. Acknowledging the disappointing results of the province of Ontario's initial investments in wind power, 23 research and development should nonetheless continue to promote diversification. Indeed, even Australia's ''solar soldiers'' should keep a few AA batteries in their pockets.
Finally, when it comes to de-coupling, inefficiency must come to be understood as a security enhancer. Hyper efficiency-as typified by industry's move to just-in-time delivery-does not promote sustainable security. The moment that an issue or challenge has been securitized, presumably, it cannot be allowed to fail. Ultimate security will therefore require a level of built-in redundancy which, by its very definition, is inefficient.
De-coupling does not imply a complete disconnect; rather, it means that a level of inefficiency is accepted within the system. Certainly, interconnectivity remains important; however, the system must also be resilient to shocks. The most significant implication of new forms of energy capture is a sustainable provision of security from vulnerability to the changing environment. This provision is necessary at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
The science and technology needed to solve many of the security challenges posed by energy capture concerns already exist. The real challenge, then, is socio-political. Habits and policies have to change to leverage the innovations that have already been revealed. The solutions are improved design, diversification, and the de-coupling of complex systems that are vulnerable to failures. When it comes to the relationship between energy and security, the phrase ''save the planet'' is misleading. The planet will be fine regardless of the actions of humankind in the Anthropocene. The planet will continue to orbit the sun. We should be pledging instead to ''save humanity'' since humankind will bear the brunt of failing to address an over-reliance on energy capture that is ultimately unsustainable.
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